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Abstract 
 
 
We provide experimental evidence that panic bank runs occur in the absence of problems 
with fundamentals and coordination failures among depositors, the two main culprits 
identified in the literature. Depositors withdraw when they observe that others do so, even 
when theoretically they should not. Our findings suggest that panic also manifests itself in the 
beliefs of depositors, who overestimate the probability that a bank run is underway. Loss-
aversion has a predictive power on panic behavior, while risk or ambiguity aversion do not. 
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Összefoglaló 
 
Tanulmányunkban kísérleti eredményeket mutatunk be arra vonatkozóan, hogy pánikszerű 
bankrohamok bekövetkezhetnek akkor is, ha a bank nem szembesül fundamentális 
problémákkal és a betétesek között sem lép fel koordinációs kudarc. A betétesek kiveszik a 
pénzüket, ha azt látják, hogy mások is így tesznek, még akkor is, ha elméletileg nem ezt 
várjuk. A pánik a betétesek vélekedésében is megjelenik, ugyanis korábbi betétkivétel 
megfigyelésekor túlbecsülik annak a valószínűségét, hogy már bankroham van.  
A veszteségkerülés magyarázó erővel bír a pánikviselkedés előrejelzésében, a kockázat- és 
bizonytalanságkerülés azonban nem. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: bankrohamok, vélekedések, pánik, koordináció, megfigyelhetőség, 
veszteségkerülés. 
 
JEL kódok: C7; C9; D8; G2 
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1. Introduction 
 
A major trigger of the last crisis were bank runs, which have been frequently associated 
to problems with the fundamentals of the bank or a coordination failure among 
depositors.4 In this paper, we consider a sequential version of the coordination problem 
embedded in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and provide experimental evidence that bank 
runs emerge even in the absence of these two problems.  
 
We show experimentally that depositors withdraw when observing that other depositors 
withdraw, even when they should rationally wait (that is, keep the money deposited). We 
refer to these runs that occur because of the observability of actions as panic bank runs. 
By eliciting beliefs, we also find that depositors have unreasonable beliefs about the 
behavior of others when they observe a withdrawal, a further signal of panic. 
 
Our paper complements empirical (e.g. Iyer and Puri, 2012; Starr and Yilmaz, 2007) and 
experimental (e.g. Brown et al., 2016; Chakravarty et al., 2014; Garratt and Keister, 2009; 
Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Davis and Reilly, 2016) studies that highlight that 
observing other depositors’ decisions affect withdrawal choices.5 Our contribution is to 
show that panic behavior can be regarded as a new source of bank runs and that observing 
withdrawals distorts the depositors’ beliefs. Besides providing clean evidence on the 
existence of panic bank runs, we find that loss-averse subjects are more likely to withdraw 
their deposits when they observe others who withdraw.  
 
2. Model 
 
Consider a modified version of the bank-run experiment in Kiss et al. (2014), where three 
depositors are endowed with 60 ECUs. 
 At t = 0, depositors invest part of their endowment (40 ECUs) in a common bank.  
                                                 
4 See, among others, Calomiris and Mason (2003) for the former and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for the 
latter.  
5 For a recent revisión of the experimental literatura see Dufwenberg (2015) and Kiss et al. (2015).  
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 At t = 1, depositors realize their liquidity needs. There is one impatient depositor who 
needs the money urgently (this depositor is forced to withdraw), while two patient 
depositors can choose whether to wait or to withdraw.6 
 At t = 2, depositors choose simultaneously how much of the remaining endowment 
(20 ECUs) they want to bid. The bids determine their position in the line. Depositors 
keep the amount they do not use to bid. 
 At t = 3, depositors contact the bank according to the order determined by their bids 
and decide in sequence whether to wait or to withdraw. Choices (but not types) are 
observable; i.e., if a withdrawal is observed, it can be due to the impatient or the other 
patient depositor. 
 
Payoffs (see Table 1) depend on the depositors’ decision and the position in the line. A 
depositor who withdraws receives 50 ECUs if the bank has enough funds. Thus, the 
depositor 3 gets 50 ECUs if at least one previous depositor has waited, but she earns 20 
ECUs if she withdraws after two withdrawals.  
 
Table 1. Payoffs in the bank-run game 
  Wait 
Position Withdraw Accompanied Alone 
1 50   
2 50 70 30 
3 50 or 20   
 
Our payoffs resemble the coordination problem in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Patient 
depositors get the maximum payoff (70 ECUs) if they coordinate and wait, but waiting 
alone results in 30 ECUs, thus a patient depositor might have incentives to withdraw. If 
choices are observable, however, sequential rationality guarantees that patient depositors 
will wait in equilibrium, regardless of their position and what they observe; i.e., the 
coordination problem disappears.7 This is because any patient depositor in position 2 or 
3 should wait if she observes a waiting. In response, any patient depositor in position 1 
                                                 
6 There is no aggregate uncertainty about the number of patient and impatient depositors, as in Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983). 
7 Kiss et al. (2014) characterize the equilibrium when depositors have partial information; i.e., not all the 
choices are observed. As in their model, patient depositors have a dominant strategy (waiting) in position 
3. They do not allow subjects to bid, though; i.e., positions are exogenously determined. 
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should wait. Therefore, the equilibrium beliefs of depositor 2 are such that withdrawals 
in position 1 should be associated to the impatient depositor. Note also that there are no 
fundamental problems in the bank as there is no uncertainty about the payoffs and all 
depositors will benefit from investing if only the impatient depositor (who has liquid ity 
needs) decides to withdraw. 
 
 
3. Experimental Design  
 
We recruited a total of 156 subjects. All sessions were run in Spain using the z-tree 
software (Fischbacher, 2007).8  
 
We used the strategy method. Subjects submitted bids as patient and as impatient 
depositors and were asked to choose whether they would wait or withdraw as patient 
depositors in position 1, in position 2 after observing a waiting and a withdrawal, and in 
position 3 after observing a waiting from depositor 1 and a withdrawal from depositor 2, 
a withdrawal from depositor 1 and a waiting from depositor 2, and two withdrawals.  
When decisions were made, we asked participants whether they believed that a 
withdrawal in position 1 was more likely due to the impatient, the patient depositor or to 
any of the types with the same probability.9  
 
All sessions ended with a questionnaire to elicit risk preferences (Crosetto and Filipp in, 
2013), loss aversion (Gachter et al., 2007) and ambiguity aversion (Halevy, 2007). We 
also collected information on gender, age, annual income and cognitive abilit ies. 
Personality traits were measured using the Big Five and the Social Value Orientation. 
 
At the end of the experiment, roles (patient or impatient) were randomly assigned and 
subjects were paid according to their choices. The experiment lasted around 1 hour. The 
average earnings were 10.5 Euros. 
 
                                                 
8 Three sessions with 24 subjects each were run at LaTEX (Universidad de Alicante) and two sessions with 
42 subjects each at LINEEX (Universidad de Valencia). Having detected no significant differences across 
locations, we pooled the results. 
9 Beliefs were only elicited at LINEEX (N = 84 participants) 
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4. Results 
 
Figure 1 displays the likelihood of withdrawal in each position. 10  Contrary to the 
theoretical prediction, depositor 2 is more likely to withdraw when withdrawal is 
observed (57.7% vs 5.1%,  p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).  
 
Figure 1. Likelihood of withdrawal in each possible information setting (N=156) 
 
 
In the unique equilibrium, depositor 2 should believe that withdrawals in position 1 are 
due to the impatient depositor. However, only 34.52% of subjects have such belief (see 
Table 2).11 Panic appears also when we compare the beliefs with the experimental data. 
First, we can form all the possible groups and use the bids to determine the order 
decisions. In this case, 73.13% of the withdrawals in position 1 would be due to impatient 
depositors. Second, we can assume that all subjects believe that others will follow their 
strategy: i.e., they will make the same bids and decisions in each information set. In this 
case, 89.75% of withdrawals would be due to impatient depositors. In both cases, we find 
that depositors overestimate the likelihood that patient depositors withdraw (p < 0.001, 
test of proportion).12  
 
                                                 
10 In the case of depositor 3 there is no difference in the likelihood of withdrawal when observing that 
depositor 1 withdraws and depositor 2 waits or the other way around  (0.090 vs 0.083, p = 0.808), thus we 
pool the results (“Obs. a waiting and a withdrawal”). 
11 Depositors are less likely to withdraw when they believe that the withdrawal was due to the impatient 
depositor, but differences across groups are not statistically significant according to the Wilcoxon rank-
sum  test (p > 0.129). 
12 The result holds also if we split those who replied that “the withdrawal was due to any of the two types 
with the same probability” (47.68%) into two groups and update the likelihood that the withdrawal is due 
to the impatient depositor to be 58.36% (34.52 + 47.68/2) (p = 0.019). 
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Table 2. Beliefs of Depositor 2 when Depositor 1 withdraws 
    
 
Experimental data 
  Rational Beliefs  
All possible 
groups  
Others 
follow my 
strategy 
     
The withdrawal was due to the…      
… impatient depositor  100% 34.52% 73.13% 89.75% 
… patient depositor 0 % 17.86% 26.87% 10.25% 
… any of the two types with the same probability  0% 47.68%   
Note. N=84 for beliefs. N=156 for the rest.  
 
While there are no fundamental problems and depositors should coordinate their actions 
in our setting, we find that i) depositors withdraw upon observing that others do, and ii) 
they overestimate the likelihood that other patient depositors withdraw, compared with 
the theoretical prediction and the experimental data. Next, we use a probit specificat ion 
and find that more loss averse / younger subjects are more likely to withdraw when they 
observe withdrawals, ceteris paribus (see Table 3).13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the session level. 
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Table 3. Marginal effects for withdrawal decisions upon observing a withdrawal in 
position 2: probit regression 
   
VARIABLES             (1)             (2) 
   
Risk aversion -0.115 -0.132 
 (0.079) (0.094) 
Loss aversion 0.200** 0.199** 
 (0.091) (0.091) 
Ambiguity aversion 0.0002 0.00002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Age -0.005*** -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Female -0.004 0.020 
 (0.110) (0.127) 
Cognitive abilities 0.033 0.028 
 (0.041) (0.048) 
Income (=1 if above median) 0.051 0.048 
 (0.076) (0.067) 
   
Social Value Orientation No Yes 
Personality (Big 5) No Yes 
   
   
Obs. Probability 0.577 0.583 
Observations 144 143 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
While traditional explanations for the occurrence of bank runs are based on fundamenta ls 
and coordination problems, we highlight that panic bank runs may occur as well. Policies 
devised to avoid bank runs, such as the deposit insurance or suspension of convertibil ity, 
must take into account this possibility. 
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